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A Space oddity? 
The Use of the Chinese Space Programme in Public Diplomacy 
Strategies 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
When the Apollo 11 famously landed the two American astronauts Neil 
Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin on the moon for the first time on 20 July 1969, the legendary 
words “One small step for man, one giant leap for mankind” were heard by an estimated 
600 million viewers worldwide.1 This historical achievement marks the end of the space 
race that had been going on between the United States and the Soviet Union for more 
than a decade. When the United States emerged from this war as the victor, they proudly 
presented this as the crown jewel on their national image, which in turn had a major 
impact on how other nations perceived them. From that moment on, the United States 
became the undisputed leading nation in advancing technology, military power and 
agenda-setting in international institutions.  
A lot has changed since this Post-Cold War global order was established. While 
some countries saw their influence decreasing, other countries entering the world stage 
dramatically increased theirs. In an unexpected turn of events, China challenged the 
status quo with a booming economic rise and playing an increasingly active role on the 
world stage. Soon China, like other countries, discovered that in order to play the power 
game, image is a paramount factor to control.  Foreign investments, tourism rates, 
exchange students, economic opportunities and international cooperation are just a few 
examples of factors that are determined by the image of a country. China has become 
very aware of this strategic resource and has since 2006 been working arduously 
towards improving and remoulding its national image through a range of different 
means. The strategic narratives of “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi ) and “harmonious world” 
(hexie shehui ) for instance, introduced by former President Hu Jintao, have already 
become common discourse. Related to this is the intensified interest in public diplomacy. 
China’s leaders have long recognised that improving China’s image is a prerequisite for 
                                                          
1 http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/15/us/moon-landing-fast-facts/index.html.  
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its economic and political rise and that public diplomacy is the key to reaching this goal.2 
A skilful use of public diplomacy has been set very high on the government agenda.3 
In this field of public diplomacy, a country can use different tools to improve its 
image. China often uses its ancient and rich culture as an important resource in public 
diplomacy. Although this is an interesting aspect of China’s public diplomacy, there is 
another tool that also features in China’s public diplomacy strategies which deserves 
even more scholarly attention: its space programme. China could be striving towards a 
similar outcome the United States obtained when they landed on the moon half a 
century ago, or could see it as a prerequisite to rise on the global power ladder, but the 
fact remains that China has invested heavily in its space programme since the launch of 
its first satellite Dongfang hong (“the east is red”) in 1970.  Investments in China’s space 
programme even skyrocketed when president Xi Jinping came to power in 2012.4 By 
making advancements in manned spaceflight, deep-space exploration and aerospace 
applications, China is slowly closing the gap between itself and the other major space-
faring powers, such as the United States, Europe and Russia, and is even becoming on a 
par with or surpassing smaller space powers such as Japan and India. China could by 
2024 possibly be the only country to be in possession of a space station. It plans to 
launch its own space station by 2022, while the International Space Station (ISS), mainly 
manned by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Roscosmos and 
European Space Agency (ESA) astronauts, is scheduled to be decommissioned in 2024. 
With its ambitious plans, innovative ideas and scientific breakthroughs, China is already 
changing the space power dynamics.  
It is therefore important to look ahead and see what the Chinese space 
programme could bring both China and the world, but also to look at how China uses its 
space programme to present itself, not only because the Chinese space programme is a 
crucial part of China’s narrative as a technologically advanced country, but also because 
it can contribute to the debate on power. By looking at the image China aims to project 
on the one hand, and China’s actual behaviour on the global stage on the other, we can 
gain some insight into China’s strategic use of its space programme and its implications. 
In this regard, my research is novel, but also fits into a larger scholarly debate. I hope my 
                                                          
2 Wang, Jian (2011), Soft power in China: public diplomacy through communication, Palgrave Macmillan, ix. 
3 Extensively researched and discussed by: D’Hooghe, Ingrid (2014), China’s Public Diplomacy, Brill. 
4 https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/aug/28/china-new-space-superpower-lunar-mars-
missions. 
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thesis can contribute to this debate by answering the question “How does China use its 
space programme in public diplomacy strategies?”.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 
In the first chapter I will give a short overview of the key developments that play 
a role in China’s increased interest in improving its image.  I will not only discuss how  
China’s public diplomacy has evolved in recent years, what its cornerstones are, and 
what framework it functions in, but also address some issues China’s public diplomacy 
system is faced with. 
When researching how the Chinese government uses its space programme in 
public diplomacy strategies, the choice to look at the tools and content of external 
communications of the Chinese government to the outside world is an obvious one. 
Public diplomacy covers three dimensions of communication: daily communication, 
strategic communication, and the development of lasting relationships.5 In the second 
chapter I will investigate the use of the Chinese space programme in public diplomacy 
by covering these three dimensions, but also by looking at the different layers of public 
diplomacy (monologue, dialogue and collaboration). The amount of monologue, dialogue 
and collaboration material in public diplomacy itself is also very characteristic of a 
country, because the difference between propaganda and public diplomacy is often said 
to be that of one-way and two-way communication.6 In order to investigate the image 
China tries to project, I have decided to analyse the discourse created by the following 
three sources. 
Firstly, I will look at a white paper about China’s space activities published in 
2016 by the State Council Information Office. This Office is the leading organ of both the 
party and the state, and responsible for the coordination of all of China’s external 
communications. The SCIO is formerly known as the Wai Xuan Ban (External 
Propaganda Office).7 This immediately indicates that there is only a blurred line 
between public diplomacy and propaganda in China. As an important messenger of the 
State’s external communication, the latest white paper that communicates China’s 
                                                          
5 Nye, Joseph (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs: New York, p. 107. 
6 D’Hooghe, Ingrid (2014), p. 26. 
7 Shambaugh, David (2013), China goes Global, Oxford University Press, p. 221. 
15/12/2017/Master Thesis  Lysan Kuipers 
6 
 
achievements and goals in space to the international public will help us gain a clear 
picture of the image China is trying to project. 
Secondly, I will analyse Chinese media coverage on China’s space programme. 
Because the range of all media articles that concern the space programme is far too 
extensive for this thesis, I have decided to focus on the main themes and narratives 
occurring in news articles within a period of three months. Examples of these narratives 
are China as a technologically advanced nation and the ‘Space dream’ as part of the 
‘China dream’. The media articles I will use are all from Xinhua News Agency. This news 
agency is state-owned, and therefore controlled by the party.  
Lastly, I will look at the extent and nature of international collaboration by the 
China National Space Administration (CNSA). As the third layer of public diplomacy, it is 
also important to look at the level of international collaboration among China and other 
countries in space. By analysing these three sources, I hope to identify a coherent picture 
of the national image with respect to its space programme that China is trying to project 
through public diplomacy. 
Beside the use of the Chinese space programme to project an image, I am also 
interested in how the Chinese space programme generates power. That is why in the 
third chapter I will look at power theory and how this is reflected in the Chinese space 
programme. Power is often described as having three dimensions: hard power, soft 
power and economic power, discussed in more detail by David Lampton in the case of 
China.8 In this chapter I will use this as a background for a discussion on power theory 
and explain why we should stop differentiating between different forms of power. 
In the final chapter I will discuss the divergence that exists between the projected 
image and China’s actual behaviour on the world stage. In contrast to the image of a 
country peacefully exploring space, I will argue that China simultaneously uses its space 
programme for military and security purposes or to guard its interests on the global 
stage. I will discuss the strategic use of China’s space programme and its implications for 
China as an international player. I will then speculate on what these newly gained 
insights mean for the future of China’s space programme. Western media often position 
China as a possible threat for the existing global order or Western presence in space, but 
will space competition really be this fierce? Will there be a space war? China is definitely 
                                                          
8 Lampton, David (2008), The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds, University of 
California Press. 
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not the only country developing its space programme at a high pace with high ambitions 
in space. I will look at the changing space power dynamics, China’s future role in space, 
and draw some conclusions on the power of China’s space programme and its impact on 
the world. China might be the first country to land on Mars, but whether we will relive 
the shift in power dynamics that followed the moon landing of 1969 remains yet to be 
seen. 
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1. Key developments and background 
 
From the moment of opening its doors to the outside world during the Deng-era 
of modernisations and new foreign policy, China has been closely watched by every 
player of the international community. Governments watched China’s explosive 
economic rise with simultaneously jealous and suspicious eyes and customers found it 
hard to buy a product in the stores that did not have ‘made in China’ on it. China’s rising 
global presence is tangible in every corner of the world, and China felt that after the 
century of humiliation (guochi ), it finally took its rightful place in the world. Though 
sometimes watched with suspicious eyes, perceived images of China in this early stage 
were generally good; China often received the benefit of the doubt.9 A newly risen 
economic power, rebuilding itself after the events of the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution, China was foremost still a developing country. It was therefore 
expected that it first saw to its people’s basic needs before addressing other pressing 
problems, such as human rights violations or corruption. But after a while, China was 
called upon more and more to become a responsible stakeholder on the world stage. 
China gradually came under more scrutiny and the “China threat” became a common 
notion. What will happen to our economy if the trade deficit with China continues to 
grow? What will the impact of China’s environmental problems be on the rest of the 
globe? How fast will China’s military power continue to grow? These questions kept the 
international community up at night. Especially in the United States China was watched 
with suspicion, since they feared that China would surpass the United States in power 
and replace them as the world leader.10 Even today, China faces these challenges 
regarding its image. When the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo died while in state 
custody, the Chinese government received international criticism for not allowing him to 
receive international medical care, and was held responsible for his death. At the same 
time steel dumping by Chinese corporations in Europe has become a major problem for 
the European Union. Joshua Ramo Cooper even takes it as far as to say that “China’s 
greatest strategic threat today is its national image. (…) How China is perceived by other 
nations – and the underlying reality that perception reflects – will determine the future 
                                                          
9 D’Hooghe, Ingrid (2010), The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 25,  
p. 14. 
10 Shambaugh, David (2013), p. 22. 
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of Chinese development and reforms.”11 Like the rest of the world, China realised that a 
country’s image is a vital strategic resource in world affairs.  
Since 2006, China has been trying to counter these negative perceptions by 
investing in public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao). At the Seventeenth National Congress 
of the Chinese Communist Party, President Hu Jintao proclaimed a  “comprehensive 
national power” (zonghe guoli ) as the key national initiative. This power would consist 
of four components: economic, military, political and soft power.  About this 
comprehensive national power Hu said that “the increase in our nation’s international 
status and influence will have to be demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, 
science and technology, and defence, as well as in soft power such as culture.”12 
Improving China’s image is a prerequisite for its economic and political rise, and China 
therefore needs public diplomacy. By introducing narratives as “peaceful rise” (heping 
jueqi ), “peaceful development” (heping fazhan) and “harmonious society” (hexie shehui ), 
China tries to project a more favourable image to the world. 
 
1.1 China’s Public Diplomacy 
 
Before investigating the image China tries to project through public diplomacy, it 
is necessary to look at what public diplomacy exactly entails. There are various opinions 
and definitions of public diplomacy, ranging from the more traditional theory that public 
diplomacy is always a state-centred process of communication with foreign audiences, 
to the opinion that public diplomacy is a skill and does not require theorising.13 In my 
thesis, public diplomacy will be understood as “the process by which direct relations 
with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of 
those being represented.”14 I will briefly describe the model China uses for public 
diplomacy, the different actors involved, the different dimensions and layers of public 
diplomacy, and China’s goals in public diplomacy. 
In the public diplomacy field there are generally two models: the state-centred 
model and the network model. In the former the state monitors the interaction between 
domestic and international policy environments, whereas in the latter non-state actors’ 
                                                          
11 Ramo Cooper, Joshua (2007), Brand China, The Foreign Policy Centre, p. 9. 
12 During the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on 4 January 2016. 
13 D’Hooghe, Ingrid (2014), p. 17. 
14 D’Hooghe, Ingrid, in: Wang, Jian, Soft Power in China: Public diplomacy through communication (2011), p. 
20. 
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involvement is more appreciated and necessary to bring the intended message across to 
targeted audiences.15 Especially in this age of globalisation, diplomacy is a two-way 
street, and therefore non-state actors, such as Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs), 
citizens and increasingly bloggers and netizens play a crucial role in gaining legitimacy 
and credibility for these messages.16 China has not yet fully embraced this network 
model, as it is struggling with loosening control on its diplomacy and limiting censuring 
the internet for the sake of public diplomacy, but it does acknowledge that non-state 
actors are of use in public diplomacy. 
Who are China’s actors in public diplomacy? This is foremost the state, with two 
leading organs: the State Council Information Office (SCIO) and the Communist Party’s 
Office of External Publicity (CPOEP).17 These two offices are in charge of developing and 
deciding on China’s public diplomacy activities and coordinating the media, with Xinhua 
News Agency as their state organ. It is difficult to understand the exact nature of these 
organisations and the relation between them, because there is a lot of secrecy around 
them, but they do have a final say in major decisions concerning public diplomacy 
policy-making. A third state actor is the Public Diplomacy Office of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs who plays a major role in implementing public diplomacy strategies. In 
addition to state actors, there are also non-state actors involved in China’s public 
diplomacy, such as NGOs, academics, overseas Chinese communities and netizens. 
Though the role of these non-state actors is limited, they do contribute to a more 
favourable image of China abroad.18 Because China is still controlling these non-state 
actors instead of seeing them as partners, David Shambaugh feels that the government is 
turning a very valuable potential source of soft power and public diplomacy into a 
liability.19 
There are three major dimensions that constitute a country’s public diplomacy: 
daily communication, strategic communication and developing long-term relationships. 
In daily communication, public diplomacy is exercised through news management. The 
second dimension concerns strategic communication, to convey a specific message or 
narrative. An example of strategic communication is the narrative of “peaceful rise”. In 
the third dimension, a country tries to build lasting relationships through cooperation or 
                                                          
15 D’Hooghe, Ingrid (2014), p. 35. 
16 Ibid., p. 36. 
17 D’Hooghe, Ingrid in: Wang, Jian (2011), p. 21. 
18 Ibid., p. 23. 
19 Shambaugh, David (2013), p. 226. 
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exchanges. There are three layers of public diplomacy to distinguish: monologue, 
dialogue and collaboration. Monologue entails the one-way communication of mass 
media and is most suited for political communication. This is an overlap with 
propaganda, which often holds a negative connotation with ‘brainwashing’.20 In the 
second layer there is a two-way communication, aimed at relationship-building. In 
collaboration as the third layer, people work together towards a shared initiative.  
Since the start of rebuilding its public diplomacy, China had four major goals in 
mind: first, China seeks understanding for its political system and policies. (…) Second, 
China wants to be seen as a stable, reliable, and responsible economic partner, a rising 
economic power that the international community does not have to fear. (…) Third, 
Beijing wants China to be seen as a trustworthy and responsible member of the 
international political community, capable of and willing to contribute actively to world 
peace. Last but not least, China wants to be acknowledged and respected as an ancient, 
but vibrant, culture.21 
 
 
1.2. Liabilities 
 
 
Despite working towards these goals and great investment in projecting a better 
image, there are some attributes that undermine China’s effectiveness in public 
diplomacy, which are influenced by two factors: a country’s political system and its 
culture. Because China has an authoritarian system, it has difficulties to adopt the 
network model of public diplomacy. China does not allow non-state actors to 
independently engage with foreign public. This is a major problem, since it leads to a 
lack of legitimacy and credibility with the receivers of the messages, the foreign public.22 
Public diplomacy is more effective if there are some shared values.23 Because China still 
does not acknowledge all political and civil rights, censors the Internet, and limits the 
freedom of dissidents and journalists, messages are not always trusted. The same goes 
for cultural identity. The fact that China’s culture differs from the intended audience, and 
                                                          
20 D’Hooghe, Ingrid (2014), p. 27. 
21 D’Hooghe, Ingrid, in: Wang, Jian (2011), p. 24. 
22 D’Hooghe, Ingrid (2014), p. 51. 
23 Ibid., p. 52. 
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the lack of cultural freedom in China, make the receivers of the messages sceptical to its 
credibility. D’Hooghe names this the fundamental barrier for China’s public diplomacy: 
as long as China does not respect civil and human rights, continues to suppress 
journalists and political dissidents, its messages will not have any credibility with the 
foreign public, and its public diplomacy will not be effective.24 
Besides some problems that arise at the sender’s end of public diplomacy, there 
are also some issues embedded at the receiver’s end. These arise when the messages 
China projects through public diplomacy do not enter neutral ground, but go through a 
cultural filter before they are interpreted. This cognitive bias happens when pre-existing 
notions of a country influence the interpretation of the message, as described in the case 
of China’s public diplomacy by Jian Wang.25 People are much more ready to accept 
information consistent with their existing perceptions than information that contradicts 
those perceptions. This means that it is highly likely that people will accept a negative 
image of a rival country, if the existing image of the country is already negative. It is 
likewise very unlikely that people will accept a positive image of a country if it 
contradicts their pre-existing perceptions of that country. The research described by 
Wang  finds a divergence in Americans’ perceptions of China and China’s self-
portrayal.26  It proclaims that China’s projected image of a peace-loving nation 
contradicts the American stereotype of communist countries, and is therefore often 
rejected. China still struggles with preconceived notions, such as its human rights 
situation, corruption, territorial conflicts in the South-China Sea and the Indian Borders, 
the suppression of Tibetans, and lack of civil and political rights. This dominant view of 
China is a fundamental barrier in its image projection and public diplomacy.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Ibid., p. 92. 
25 In: Wang, Jian (2011), chapter three: China’s Image Projection and Its Impact. 
26 Ibid., p. 46 
27 Ibid., p. 43. 
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2. The research 
 
In my attempt to analyse the discourse created through public diplomacy about 
the Chinese space programme, I was faced with a myriad of questions that need 
answering. For example: what is meant by ‘discourse’? Discourse constructed by whom? 
What is meant by communication? How does this analysis work? This section is 
dedicated to explaining the analytical framework of my research. 
The term ‘discourse’ is used very differently by various researchers in various 
academic cultures.28 This ranges from a more text-based approach that discourse covers 
all forms of communication, both written and oral texts, to a Foucauldian notion that 
discourse is “the flow of knowledge through time”.29 Siegfried Jäger and Florentine 
Maier built their own theories on this theoretical foundation, and elaborate that 
‘knowledge’ refers to all kinds of meanings that people use to interpret and shape their 
environment with.30 Discourse therefore does not only reflect reality, but also shapes 
and enables it, making it a social construction.31 
Through everyday communication knowledge is transmitted. “Communication” is 
the practice of coding a message and transmitting it from a source to a destination, 
where it is decoded and interpreted. The power of discourse is to naturalise such 
processes and assumptions to seem self-evident. This immediately signals how 
discourse is fundamentally related to the question of power, because, as Manuel Castell 
points out, “power relies on the control of communication”.32 People in power 
sometimes own the means of communication and therefore have the power to construct 
our knowledge of the world. Mass media e.g. are often scrutinised for having too much 
power to create discourse. Regardless of whether these created ‘truths’ are a fallacy or 
not, they still become part of our knowledge and reality. When these social truths make 
most people within a society think alike about certain matters and even forgetting that 
there are alternatives to the status quo, we have reached Gramsci’s notion of 
hegemony.33  The person who is at the heart of creating discourse, is where the power is 
located. One individual will have a limited influence on a discourse, because everybody 
                                                          
28 Wodak, Ruth and Meyer, Michael 2009), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, Sage Publications, p. 6. 
29 Jäger, Siegfried in Wodak and Meyer (2009), p. 35. 
30 Ibid., p. 34. 
31 Ibid., p. 36. 
32 http://www.politicseastasia.com/studying/how-to-do-a-discourse-analysis/, on: 3 May 2013. 
33 Wodak, Ruth and Meyer, Michael (2009)., p. 8. 
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is co-producing discourse and discourses take on a life of their own as they evolve, but a 
powerful group does have the chance to accomplish changes in discourse in the long 
run.34 It is exactly this interplay that makes it interesting to analyse a discourse and how 
it affects power.  
 One of the methods of analysis is a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA can be 
defined as being fundamentally interested in analysing opaque as well as transparent 
structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested 
in language.35 CDA does not constitute a well-defined empirical methodology, but is both 
multi-disciplinary and multi-methodological and knows many different approaches. 
Which approach you use always depends on your research question and the material 
you are working with. This means you do not have to dogmatically adhere to certain 
methodological steps if they do not fit your research, but there are three criteria: the 
methodology needs validity, reliability and objectivity.36  
 
Analytical Framework 
 
 My analytical framework heavily relies on the dispositive approach, elaborated 
on by Jäger and Maier, grounded in the Foucauldian theories on power.37 This approach 
focuses on the link between discourse and reality and between discourse and power. As 
discussed previously, discourse expresses social practice and exercises power in a 
society, because they institutionalise and regulate ways of talking, thinking and acting.38 
The dispositive aspect of this approach is rather a tricky one. In reality, humans assign 
meaning to reality. This not only affects our discursive practices, but also our non-
discursive practices. Dispositive analysis examines how such assignments of meaning 
create reality.39 Because this is not the aim of my research, I will not include this aspect 
into my analytical strategy. The purpose of my research is to determine the discourse 
created by the Chinese government on its space programme by using three sources: a 
policy document, an item of media coverage and an action (in cooperation). Although I 
                                                          
34 Ibid., p. 38. 
35 Ibid., p. 10. 
36 Ibid., p. 31. 
37 Ibid., chapter 2: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis and 
Dispositive Analysis.  
38 Ibid., p. 35. 
39 Ibid., p. 39. 
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acknowledge that these three sources provide an empirically thin foundation for 
drawing conclusions on China’s projected image, I argue that they will still be able to 
provide us with a clear picture of China’s public diplomacy message, as the three sources 
cover all layers of public diplomacy, and are all controlled by the Chinese government. 
 The most important data for my research are the images that are projected through 
discourse. My analysis consists of four components: (1) creating context and 
background information of the source and the producer of the source, (2) a structural 
analysis of the discourse strands, (3) a detailed analysis of discourse fragments, and (4) 
a synoptic analysis.  
 
2.1 White Paper 
 
The Chinese government is fairly secretive about its space programme (e.g. the 
budget is unknown). Therefore any communication about it is controlled by the 
government, and manifests itself in either white papers, speeches by spokespersons or 
government officials and media articles by state-owned newspaper agencies. That is 
why I first choose to analyse a white paper published in 2016 about China’s activities 
and goals in space.  
 This white paper was made public on 27 December 2016 on the official 
website of the State Council Information Office, and duplicated on the official website of 
the China National Space Administration. The publisher is the SCIO, the official 
government organ responsible for external communication. Every five years a white 
paper on space is published to update on China’s progress in space technology and its 
future plans. The white paper is written in English in order to reach as many people as 
possible. The target audience is the international community, but the audience reached 
might be a more select group. White papers are usually studied by government officials 
of other countries and other space organisations and academics, but the general public 
is more difficult to reach by using a white paper. That is why the CNSA decided to 
summarise and simplify the white paper (which is twenty pages in total) into an 
illustrated info graphic. I will, however, analyse the white paper itself. 
The white paper is structured as follows: it starts with a preamble. The main text 
consists of five chapters: 1. Purposes, Vision and Principles of Development; 2. Major 
Developments since 2011; 3. Major Tasks for the Next Five Years; 4. Policies and 
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Measures for Development; and 5. International Exchanges and Cooperation. The White 
Paper ends with a conclusion. This is the same structure as the white paper from five 
years ago, only this time they added a conclusion. 
 The vocabulary is very technical and formal, as befitting of an official policy 
document. Paragraphs are neatly structured and divided into different sections.  
 In the structural analysis of discourse strands, I have divided the content into 
eight distinct discourse strands.  
 
1) Space exploration based on cooperation 
2) China as an advanced technological power 
3) Space exploration by peaceful means 
4) China’s space programme targeting the well-being of mankind 
5) China’s space programme used for (national) security 
6) China’s space programme as independent and self-reliant 
7) China as a developing country 
8) Little emphasis on military use of space programme 
 
In this section I will explain each discourse strand individually, and substantiate each 
with a discourse fragment from the white paper. How these discourse strands are 
present in the other two sources, I will elaborate in the next section. 
 
1) Space exploration based on international cooperation. 
 
The observation that ‘cooperation’ is used 43 times throughout the text40 is 
indicative of the importance the Chinese government attaches to projecting a 
cooperative attitude to the outside world. An entire chapter of the white paper is 
dedicated to summarising China’s bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements. 
International cooperation is also the main area of development goals. Since 2011 China 
has signed 43 space cooperation agreements or memoranda of understanding with 29 
countries, space agencies and international organisations. In the text, it emphasises the 
need for this cooperation, and the need to abide by international principles for space 
cooperation. When looking more closely at the key areas of future cooperation, China 
                                                          
40 Not counting ‘cooperation’ in names of organisations, treaties or agreements. 
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aims to manifest this cooperation mainly in regional platforms, such as the One Belt, One 
Road Space Information Corridor, and any cooperation in BRICS or the Asia-Pacific 
Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO).  
The conclusion of the white paper ends with the sentence: 
 
“China will promote the lofty cause of peace and development together with other 
countries.” 41 
 
By focusing on the collaborative aspect of space exploration, China positions itself less as 
a threat, and more as a partner. 
 
2) China as an advanced technological power 
 
Another image projected through this text is China as a technologically highly 
advanced country. As expected of a white paper on space activities, a lot of the content 
covers China’s technological achievements in space in very scientific language, but also 
uses adjectives such as “key (technologies)”, “major (projects)” and “important 
(experiments)”. By dedicating an entire chapter to their achievements in space from 
2011 onwards and explaining their future development plans, they focus on the actual 
technology required. That projects an image of a strong, technologically advanced 
country. ‘Technology’ is used 28 times throughout the text. 
 
3) Space exploration by peaceful means 
 
Another discourse strand is one of an already existing narrative: the peaceful rise. 
In the text,  ‘peace’ or its derivative ‘peaceful’ is named 14 time. In the text, China 
emphasises the peaceful aspect of space exploration, by naming the documents that 
subscribe to this principle (Interests of All States and the Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies  and the Declaration on International Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit, Taking into Particular Account the 
Needs of Developing Countries and in the Interests of All States), focusing on the legal 
aspect of peaceful exploration of space. Peaceful exploration and cooperation are 
                                                          
41 White Paper, conclusion. 
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reiterated in China’s own vision on space exploration and cooperation.  By positioning 
peaceful exploration of space not just as its own principle, but also as a legal 
requirement of other countries, China seems to expect a likewise peaceful attitude from 
other countries in space. This is evidently shown in one of the first sentences of the 
preamble: 
  
“The Chinese government takes the space industry as an important part of the nation’s 
overall development strategy, and adheres to the principle of exploration and utilization of 
outer space for peaceful purposes.“ 42 
 
 
4) China’s space programme targeting the well-being of mankind 
 
A country’s space programme can have benefits for both the national and 
international public. In this white paper China tries to emphasise the benefits its space 
programme can have for the ‘whole of mankind’. The word ‘mankind’ is used nine times 
throughout the text, of which eight in the context of ‘benefiting or improving the well-
being of mankind’. A sentence that evidently reflects this sentiment is the following: 
 
“China is determined to quicken its pace of developing its space industry,(…) so that 
achievements in space activities will serve and improve the well-being of mankind in a 
wider scope, at a deeper level and with higher standards.”43 
 
5) China’s space programme used for (national) security 
 
While the previous discourse strand focuses on universal benefits of China’s space 
programme, this discourse strand focuses on how the space programme can enhance 
China’s (national) security. ‘Security’ is used eight times, of which three times in 
combination with ‘national’. In its purposes in space, China proclaims: 
 
“(…)to meet the demands of economic, scientific and technological development, national 
security and social progress.”44 
                                                          
42 White Paper, preamble. 
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Security remains one of China’s foremost purposes, repeated in its ‘vision in space’ and 
the ‘principles’. In the technological achievements and applications in space, is explained 
how this can contribute to national security.  
 
 
6) China’s space programme as independent and self-reliant 
 
The white paper shows that China is striving towards ‘self-reliance and 
independent innovation’. The words ‘independent’ and ‘self-reliant’ are named seven 
times in the text, and amongst four in combination with ‘innovation’. This indicates that 
China no longer wants to rely on other countries’ technological knowledge or space 
equipment. The following sentence summarises this desire.  
 
“It has opened up a path to self-reliance and independent innovation, and 
has created the spirit of China’s space industry.”45 
 
7) China as a developing country 
 
Throughout the text, China refers to different legal frameworks and international 
rules on space exploration to abide by, but the focus is on the equal right of all countries 
to explore space, in particular taking into account the needs of developing countries. In 
addition to recognising developing countries’ right to explore space, China also values 
cooperating with developing countries and providing developing countries the 
opportunity to launch satellites (e.g. as China has launched a satellite for Nigeria). By 
focusing on this cooperation, China associates itself with developing countries, and 
arguably positions itself as a developing country itself.  
 
8) Little emphasis on military use of space programme 
 
An interesting observation is that the military aspect of China’s space programme is 
conspicuous by its absence. The words ‘military’ or ‘defence’ are not used in the text. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
44 White Paper, I (1). 
45 White Paper, preamble. 
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There is some room for the security aspect of the space programme, and in the 
technology section some applications are named, e.g. the atomic hydrogen bombs, but 
throughout the vision, principles, development plans or anything else, the Chinese 
government does not mention military application of space technology. Since the 
military aspect is not being mentioned throughout the text, it can be said that this 
absence is indicative of the discourse that the Chinese government tries to create of a 
peaceful country.  
 
Before I move on to analysing the next source, there are a few specific discourse 
fragments of the white paper that I would like to discuss. 
 
Two times in the text, a country’s space programme is linked to social progress. 
The white paper states that a country’s space activities are an important driving force 
for social progress, and that therefore the development of space activities are a strategic 
choice.46 This is indicative of the fact that the producers of this text could be of the 
opinion that a strong space programme is an indicator of a country’s social progress.  
The second fragment encompasses China’s dream to become a space power as 
part of the ‘China Dream’, introduced by Xi Jinping. In the ‘purpose’ section of the white 
paper is stated: “To explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry and build China 
into a space power is a dream we pursue unremittingly.” China is pursuing the goal of 
becoming a space power, and wants to be acknowledged as such. The term ‘dream’, 
while they could also have chosen ‘goal’ or ‘aim’, fits in this larger narrative of “China 
Dream”, which people might associate more with a peaceful wish, instead of a strategic 
strength. The quote itself is in the white paper positioned as a quote (using quotation 
marks), but has not been used before in speeches or other policy documents. It is 
difficult to dissect what the purpose is of making it a quote, but it could be to make it 
easier for e.g. foreign media, if they want to quote one sentence from the white paper, 
that they might have chosen that sentence.  
Another discourse fragment corresponds to the key areas of future cooperation. 
Throughout the white paper China has emphasized peaceful cooperation based on 
mutual interest, and aimed at benefitting the whole of mankind. However, when it states 
the key areas for future cooperation, the first three points are: 1) Construction of the 
                                                          
46 White Paper, preamble. 
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Belt and Road Initiative Space Information Corridor (BRISIC), 2) implementing BRICS 
joint initiatives, and 3) implementing APSCO joint initiatives.47 The construction of the 
BRISIC is part of China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative. This strategic initiative, launched 
in 2014, is China’s common thread in its foreign policy, and through infrastructural 
investments on land and sea aims to connect China through Central-Asia and Europe 
with the rest of the world. This serves China’s economic and geopolitical interests and 
amplifies China’s power among his neighbours. The construction of the BRISIC will 
further improve and benefit the development of the OBOR. Two other observations are 
intensified cooperation in two regional organisations in which China is the leading 
country, and in which member countries are often developing countries.   
When looking at textual features, the first thing that catches the eye, is the fact 
that the text uses ‘we’ to refer to the writer of the text (‘we’ is used ten times in the text). 
The use of ‘we’ in a policy document gives a sense of community, as if the text is on 
behalf of all the Chinese people, and is a collective aim. 
 
These discourse fragments and discourse strands from the white paper together 
form a unitary picture, that features the image of China as a technologically advanced 
country, that pursues space exploration by peaceful means (by stressing legal 
frameworks for peaceful space exploration and avoiding mention of the military use of 
its space programme) and expects other countries to do the same. It strives towards 
intensified cooperation, but mainly to cater to its own interests in construction of the 
OBOR and regional cooperation organisations, while claiming that its space programme 
will benefit the whole of mankind. China wants to be acknowledged by other countries 
as a space power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 White Paper, V (3.3). 
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Word Frequency in White Paper on China’s Activities in Space 2016 
           Figure 1 
 
 
 
2.2. Xinhua Media Coverage 
 
 The discourse strands I dissected for the white paper also feature prominently in 
the analysis of media coverage on China’s space programme.  
Founded in 1931, Xinhua News Agency is China’s official state news service and a 
Communist Party Central Committee organ. From its inception, Xinhua has had the dual 
role to report news and to disseminate Party and state propaganda.48 In the last 
decennium, Xinhua has expanded its reach globally to opening more bureaus in different 
countries and setting up its own online English-language news channels as a new source 
of information for global audiences. In this section, I will analyse the discourse strands 
and discourse fragments featuring in Xinhua news articles on the Chinese space 
programme of the months April, May and June of 2017 in order to avoid “cherry-picking”. 
I have categorised any article published in these three months by Xinhua News Agency 
as reporting on China’s space programme when the article features China’s space 
programme, China’s presence in space, China’s plans or ambitions in space, or China’s 
space technology. Although I acknowledge that three months of media coverage on the 
Chinese space programme is too short to make substantial observations about the 
                                                          
48 Shambaugh, David (2013), p. 228. 
Word Frequency 
Cooperation 43 
International 28 
Technology 27 
Peace 14 
National 13 
We 10 
Mankind 9 
Security 8 
Independent/Self-reliance 7 
Military/Defence 0 
15/12/2017/Master Thesis  Lysan Kuipers 
23 
 
intended message, I do argue that the material will suffice in my aim to provide a clear 
picture of the primary message, because 1) in a short period of time, a common thread 
through these articles already become apparent, and 2) messages are reiterated through 
various articles in a short period of time. The news articles are accessible on the Xinhua 
website, and written in English, targeting a global audience. I have divided the discourse 
strands into five categories. 
 
1) China as a technologically advanced country 
 
The narrative of a technologically advanced country turns up in the news articles 
as well. Under the rubric “Science and Technology” on the Xinhua News Agency website, 
in two weeks (picked random) the space programme is mentioned in nineteen out of 
forty articles.49 That means that of all the articles about science and technology almost 
half is dedicated to the Chinese space programme. The image is projected through 
emphasising China’s achievements in space, making a country’s space programme a 
symbol for its scientific and technological strength. 
 
2) China aiming for cooperation 
 
Peaceful cooperation and willingness to cooperate with other countries is 
another discourse strand that features prominently in the news articles I analysed. 
Whether it is President Xi Jinping, first Chinese Astronaut Yang Liwei, the director from 
CNSA, or experts from the Institute for Manned Space System Engineering, they all 
emphasise the need for international cooperation. One of the articles state: 
 
“Xi noted that progress in space science and technology will benefit people around 
the world and China wants to use space exploration achievements to create a better 
future for mankind.”50 
 
This segment yet again stresses how the space programme will benefit the whole 
of mankind. The willingness to cooperate is reflected in China’s plans for its space 
                                                          
49 In the week of 10 till 16 May and 1 till 7 June. 
50 Xinhua article “China Focus: Space race or cosmic cooperation? China strongly calls for the latter”, 7 June 
2017. 
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station. In the articles, published by Xinhua, regular updates are given as to the progress 
the space station mission is making. China’s space station is set to be completed in 2022. 
China is busy with preparations for this space station by sending modules and other 
parts of the space station to the already existing space lab Tiangong-2. Almost all articles 
concerning this space station emphasise how China will be the only country with a space 
station after 2024. Here I quote: 
 
“As the International Space Station is set to retire in 2024, the Chinese space station 
will offer a promising alternative, and China will be the only country with a 
permanent space station.” 51 
 
By stressing the uniqueness of having its own space station, China is not only building a 
foundation for future cooperation on Chinese terms, but also indicating, by using ‘a 
promising alternative’, how it might be necessary for other countries to cooperate with 
China. 
 
3) China as a developing country 
 
Another article52 states that China has made an agreement with the United 
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs to open its space station, planned to be launching 
into orbit in 2022, to other countries, especially developing countries, for payload 
experiments.  
 
“Under the framework, China will open its experimental resources on the Chinese 
space station to serve payloads from other countries. UN members, especially 
developing countries, could conduct scientific and technological experiments on 
Chinese space station, Wei said.”53 
 
This amplifies the projected image of China as an advocate of developing countries’ right 
to explore space.  
 
                                                          
51 Xinhua Article “China's cargo spacecraft completes second docking with space lab”, 19 June 2017.  
52 Xinhua Article “China to open space station to scientists worldwide”, 8 June 2017. 
53 Ibid. 
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4) Little attention to military purposes 
 
In the news articles, the focus is on civilian use of the space technology, rather 
than on the military use. When articles do mention it, they discuss how the space 
programme will add to national security. That does not mean that the military use of the 
space programme does not exist: it is merely not highlighted, suggesting that this is not 
the image China wants to project. 
 
5) Space Dream 
 
Even more prominently than in the white paper, the Chinese progression in space 
is symbolised as a ‘space dream of the Chinese people’. In response to all the major 
Chinese achievements in space, Xi Jinping has referred to them as a “dream”. When 
astronauts were sent off to the space lab in 2013, Xi said "Developing the space program 
and turning the country into a space power is the space dream that we have 
continuously pursued."54 During a video call with the astronauts, he said: "The space 
dream is part of the dream to make China stronger. With the development of space 
programs, the Chinese people will take bigger strides to explore further into space.” By 
reiterating the “space dream” narrative, China is integrating it in its discourse, and 
projecting it as a more peaceful aspiration.  
 
 
 
2.3 Collaboration in Space 
 
As the third layer of public diplomacy, collaboration is an important tool in 
projecting an image, as it shows a country’s willingness to exchange views and 
knowledge which requires a trusting attitude. As we have seen in the previous sections, 
China is already working hard on expanding its collaboration in space, and has since 
                                                          
54 Xinhua article “Xi Jinping's vision for China's space development”, of 24 April 2017. 
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2011 signed 43 space cooperation agreements or memoranda of understanding with 29 
countries, space agencies and international organizations.55 This cooperation covers 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Some are purely exchanging science and 
technological knowledge; others are to jointly work on a space project. There is also 
commercial cooperation, where China exports satellites or is launching communication 
satellites for other countries, or where it sets up joint commissions. In this section I will 
analyse these different forms of cooperation. 
 
First of all, China emphasises its active participation in multilateral fora, such as 
the International Astronautical Federation, the International Committee on Space 
Research, International Academy of Astronautics and the International Institute of Space 
Law. China also states as the first fundamental policy in space cooperation that everyone 
should work within the framework of peaceful space exploration of the United Nations. 
By projecting an image of a country that abides by international space fora rules, China 
looks more benign and less of a threat. 
Within the mechanism of the China-Europe Joint Commission on Space 
Cooperation, China and the European Space Agency have intensified their cooperation in 
the field of deep space exploration and worked together on the Dragon programmes.56 
In addition to Europe, China has also intensified space cooperation with Russia in deep 
space exploration, manned spaceflight, earth observation, satellite navigation, space-
related electronic parts and components, and other areas. Apart from the above-
mentioned bilateral agreements, China has other bilateral agreements with various 
countries. We can make an interesting observation when we look at China’s outline for 
future cooperation, where less attention is placed on bilateral cooperation, while usually 
that is China’s preferred method of solving disputes, and more focus on cooperation 
within a multilateral framework, such as the BRICS and APSCO. This does serve one of 
the most important components of public diplomacy: relationship building. When 
building long-term relationships with your target audience, you have a better chance of 
getting the meaning of your message across.  
                                                          
55 White paper,  V (2).  
56 The Dragon Programme covers more than ten years of cooperation between China and the European 
Space Agency on more than fifty thematic projects, such as collecting data for geo-science applications on 
land and sea. 
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Within China’s cooperation efforts, we see that China does not neglect developing 
countries, as reiterated in speeches and in the white paper. China claims that it supports 
developing countries in realising their own space dream, but what we see in the actual 
cooperation process is that China mainly has an ongoing commercial connection with 
them. In the last two years, China has exported satellites and launched Nigeria’s 
communication satellite, Venezuela’s remote-sensing satellite-1, Bolivia’s 
communications satellite, Laos’ communications satellite-1 and Belarus’ 
communications satellite-1.57 This evidently shows that in terms of cooperation, China 
wants to project a more positive image of wanting to help developing countries pursue 
their space dream, without forsaking its own interests in making it a commercial 
cooperation. This ties into the next point. 
In the fundamental policies of international cooperation in space, the principle 
that China emphasises is that in bilateral and multilateral cooperation, cooperation 
should be based on common goals and should serve the One Belt, One Road initiative.58 
One of the new policies China is implementing is the construction of the Belt and Road 
Initiative Space Information Corridor. Consequently, China is expanding its One Belt, 
One Road Initiative to space. This space information corridor includes earth observation, 
communications and broadcasting, navigation and positioning, and ground and 
application system construction. This form of cooperation serves China’s strategic and 
economic goals in this field. This use of China’s space programme to support the One 
Belt, One Road initiative, could arguably show that the Chinese space programme 
foremost serves China’s national interests.  
Lastly, as we have already seen, China is keen on inviting other countries to work 
together on its new space station, which is expected to be completed in 2022. China has 
already signed an agreement with the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs to 
create the framework for this cooperation. The plan is that other countries could 
conduct scientific and technological experiments on board the space station. I would 
again like to stress that the projected image is that of a welcoming country, allowing 
other countries to use their space station. As the dynamics of master and guest change, 
China could have a paramount role in space when countries are using their space station. 
 
                                                          
57 White Paper, V (3).  
58 White Paper, V (3.3). 
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2.4 Additional Observations 
 
Before I move on to the synoptic analysis of these public diplomacy sources, there 
are two more aspects of China’s public diplomacy with respect to its space station that I 
would like to discuss. 
 
We have seen that communication through texts creates discourse. There is 
another element that can also be used to enforce a certain image, namely: symbols. I 
would like to briefly elaborate on the chosen names for space missions, rockets or 
satellites in China’s space programme, as these all enforce an image through symbols. 
 The first satellite that China launched in 1970 was called the Dongfang hong, 
meaning: “the East is Red”. At that moment China was in the middle of the Cultural 
Revolution, initiated by Mao Zedong to purge the party from rightists or ‘contra-
revolutionaries’, and celebrating communism. “The East is Red” refers to a popular 
communist song around that time.  
 China’s lunar programme has been very successful;, the lunar mission itself is 
called Chang’e, referring to the queen of the moon in Chinese folklore, and the moon 
rover Yutu, “Jade Rabbit”, is also part of a Chinese story. The carrier rockets Changzheng 
are named after the Long March, a journey where the communists escaped from the 
Jiangxi Mountain area, and ended in them setting base in Yan’an.  
 All these names reflect China’s pride in its national history and culture. Although 
this is a useful tool in nation building, the question whether this also resonates with an 
international public is hard to perceive, since there might be little shared values or 
common history from the perspective of the international public.  
Another element of the Chinese government’s discourse on its space programme 
is the introduction of China Space Day. In this section, we will see how this event uses 
symbolism and is used as a tool for strengthening nationalism.  
 China Space Day was introduced on 24 April 2016 by the CCP Central Committee 
and the State Council to commemorate the launching of China’s first satellite Dongfang 
hong-1. The China National Space Administration (CNSA) and the State Administration 
of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND) are responsible for 
the coordination of activities around this event. This annual event was designated to 
stimulate enthusiasm for innovation and science in space, especially amongst children 
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and university students in order to inspire them to become the next generation of space 
scientists, and to celebrate China’s achievements and goals in space. Throughout China, 
events were held to serve these goals, such as space exhibitions, and speeches by 
Chinese astronauts and space scientists. On the first China Space Day, President Xi 
Jinping issued instructions in his speech “exploring the vast universe, developing the 
space industry and building a great space power".59 In his speech, Xi encouraged the 
country's aerospace scientists and engineers to usher in a new chapter in aerospace 
development.60 He also proclaimed that becoming an aerospace power was China’s 
space dream. By reiterating China’s achievements in space and focusing on the new 
generation of space scientists, China projects an image of a technologically strong 
country that put its mind to continuing investments in the space industry. They use 
stories from (former) astronauts to describe life aboard a space lab, and how the 
application of space technology can contribute to economic and social development. By 
focusing on the soft elements in their space power instead of the hard elements, they 
create a more positive image abroad and domestically. 
 This also touches on China’s public diplomacy system, because it does not 
differentiate between foreign outreach and domestic communication. Ingrid D’Hooghe 
writes that “Domestic outreach not only contributes to the quality and legitimacy of 
foreign outreach, but is also regarded as a tool for strengthening national unity and 
encouraging the government to take the people’s interests into account.”61 In this regard, 
the space programme is used as a tool for strengthening nationalism and symbolising 
the road of success the CNSA is on.  
 
 
2.5. Synoptic analysis 
 
What do the three sources of China’s white paper on space, Xinhua News Agency 
coverage and China’s collaboration tell us about the intended image the Chinese 
government is trying to project and the discourse position it takes? In the previous 
analysis we have seen that through public diplomacy China projects a benign image of 
its space programme. It puts an emphasis on international cooperation in abidance with 
                                                          
59 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1044024.shtml. 
60 Ibid. 
61 D’Hooghe, Ingrid (2014), p. 130. 
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international space rules on peaceful space exploration, and expects of other countries 
to do the same. In space cooperation, China specifically acknowledges and takes into 
account the needs and rights of developing countries to explore space. Furthermore, by 
focusing on the benefits the space programme will have on the whole of mankind, China 
positions itself as a partner instead of a competitive player. 
At the same time, some intentions seem to come to surface, apparent and hidden 
at the same time. First of all, when it comes to international cooperation and future 
policy goals, China puts its own initiatives and interests within the One Belt, One Road 
framework first. This is followed by the focus on regional space cooperation in a 
multilateral framework where China’s position is strongest. Lastly, China emphasises 
cooperation on its future space station, signalling the importance of the fact that China 
will be the only country with a permanently manned space station. 
Throughout the white paper and the media articles on the space programme, we 
gather that China wants to be acknowledged as an independent, self-reliant space power, 
wherein emphasis does not lie on the military applications of space technology. 
In creating this discourse, a framework is created for cooperating with China in 
space on Chinese terms. Cooperation is desired, especially since international 
cooperation with China is limited to a certain level. Due to restrictions the US Congress 
has placed on NASA for cooperating with China in 2011, China cannot cooperate with 
other space agencies on the International Space Station. Furthermore, NASA is 
dominating some major joint projects, the most important ones being conducted on the 
International Space Station, but also other projects, such as a joint mission to Mars with 
ESA. China positions itself as a partner in space exploration, but commercial space 
activities so far target developing countries. China furthermore stimulates cooperation 
through a more active role in regional organisations, such as BRICS and APSCO. 
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3. The Pains and Gains of Power  
 
In the previous chapter I have identified some distinct messages China is trying to 
project with respect to its space programme. In this chapter I will investigate how power 
is generated by China’s space programme. I plan to do this by first using the analyses of a 
number of scholars, amongst whom Joseph Nye and David Lampton as a background for 
a discussion on power. A rarely challenged consensus is that power is delineated into 
three categories: coercive (hard), remunerative (economic), and normative (soft) power. 
Especially the latter has initiated a vociferous academic debate. I will hopefully 
contribute to this debate by discussing what both Western and Chinese academics have 
written on the subject, advocating for not differentiating between the different 
dimensions of power, and by concluding with my own thoughts on the issue. In the 
second section I will investigate the power dimension of the Chinese space programme. 
 
3.1. Theories on Power 
 
3.1.1. What is power? 
 
Scholars have theorised about the notion of power for millennia. Plato (428-348 
BC) describes in his Republic how power can be derived from knowledge, opinion or 
ignorance, and Machiavelli (1469-1527) wrote in his Il Principe about political power 
and how to make that reside within one person. Even less philosophically inclined 
people, like myself, have a sense of what power actually is: the ability to get what you 
want, or in more concise words “power is the ability to achieve one’s purposes or goals 
through threat, payment or attraction.”.62 In this definition the division between various 
forms of power already becomes clear, which Amitai Etzioni describes in more detail as 
coercive, remunerative, and normative power.63 Coercive power or hard power relies on 
the application or the threat of application, of physical sanctions. These coercive 
instruments can be military force or, in diplomatic relations, international isolation. 
Remunerative power concerns all money or material resources that can be converted to 
power. An example of this power is economic sanctions. Because economic power is also 
                                                          
62 Nye, Joseph (1997), Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Public Affairs, p. 62. 
63 Etzioni, Amitai (1971), A comparative analysis of complex organisations, The Free Press, p. 5. 
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used in a coercive way, we already see an overlap between the different dimensions of 
power.  
The third dimension of power is normative power, which also set off the biggest 
explosion of scholarly discussion about the concept. Etzioni’s definition states that 
normative power “relies on the capacity to motivate through the force of ideas and win 
compliance through creating group norms with which individuals wish to identify.”64 
David Lampton’s similar notion of “ideational power” which adds to the concept of 
normative power emphasises the fact that power derives from human intellect, power 
expressed in the creation and dissemination of knowledge and compelling ideas.65 
Joseph Nye explains his term “soft power” as “the ability to get what you want through 
attraction, or to make people want a similar outcome as you.”66 In all cases, this form of 
power is about attraction that can be converted to power. But even more so than the 
ability to decide an outcome, it is about the ability to define an outcome and set the 
agenda. Especially in international plethora this is a very useful resource, because 
seduction is more effective than coercion. Within these three dimensions of power, there 
exists a constant interplay with different dimension reinforcing or weakening the other. 
As mentioned before, economic sanction fits into the category of remunerative power, 
but can feel very coercive or be used in a coercive way. While some actions strengthen 
one form of power, they weaken the other. When the Soviet Union launched the satellite 
Sputnik in 1957, their soft power grew, because people were attracted to the science 
prestige, but their hard power grew as well, as they were able to deploy warheads on 
top of those rockets. In this sense, hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and 
sometimes interfere with each other. 
 The concept of soft power is ideologically charged and has its roots in the West. 
When in the nineties the United States were faced with an apparent decline in power, 
the American political scientist Joseph Nye tried to explain this decline by claiming that 
the US’s power had actually not diminished; although their hard power had declined, 
they had gained a more abstract form of power that made other countries want to follow 
their example by an attracting force.67 This is what Nye calls “soft power”: through this 
power you could obtain the desired outcome by people wanting to follow your 
                                                          
64 Ibid. 
65 Lampton, David (2008), The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds, University of 
California Press, p. 10. 
66 Nye, Joseph (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, p. 2. 
67 Ibid., p. 20. 
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example.68 He made some suggestions to the American government on how to improve 
its soft power or combine the different forms into a smart use of power. It only took a 
few years for this concept to become a hype throughout the world, with scholars writing 
about and researching soft power and governments implementing entire strategies to 
strengthen its nation’s soft power. At the same time, soft power became a tool in itself 
that countries use to compete against each other. I primarily take two issues with the 
notion of soft power as a distinct form of power. 
According to Nye, a country’s soft power primarily derives from three sources: 
culture, political values and foreign policy. These sources ought to produce attraction, 
but whether this attraction in turn produces the desired outcome, is difficult to measure. 
This is the first point I find problematic in Nye’s theoretical framework of soft power. 
Between producing attraction and using that attraction lies a very complex process, that 
I feel Nye insufficiently explains in his work. The second point I would like to address is 
the concept of “attraction” itself. Attraction differs per individual and per country. What 
one country may find attractive, another may find repulsive. To developing countries 
another country’s massive economic rise may look very attractive, but when global 
warming is progressing dramatically, the country that invests most in sustainable 
development, looks more attractive. A conclusion could also be that the things any soft 
power resource produces, are more concerned with prestige. People may look up to a 
certain country, e.g. because of its fast economic rise or great military force, but are not 
necessarily attracted by that country’s political models. The prestige is something they 
acknowledge and respect, but they still do not want to follow their example.  
I therefore argue that any distinction made between soft and hard power is a 
theoretical one. It does not matter whether it is driven by attraction, prestige or other 
motives, that people want to follow another country’s example or let that country be in 
charge of the agenda-setting in international affairs. This power might be used in a soft 
way, but the power that is felt by the people on the receiving end might still feel coercive, 
even on a subconscious level. This could contribute to an interdisciplinary debate on 
whether this creates an environment where the feeling of power is already determined 
(determinism) and therefore is actually a coercive force, or whether people still decide 
for themselves whether they are attracted by a country (free will). As soon as power has 
implications in real life, it can no longer be called ‘soft’. William Callahan argues that soft 
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power is not a material entity that can be empirically measured, but a social 
construction.69 I therefore argue that the distinction between soft and hard power is 
irrelevant when researching a country’s power capacity.  
 
3.1.2. China’s views on soft power 
 
Since China has become aware of the use of soft power as a tool for international 
competition, soft power has become an excessively debated, studied and talked about 
subject among academics and government officials in China. As an official component of 
the “Comprehensive National Power”, proclaimed by Hu Jintao in 2006, soft power 
features prominently in China’s national strategy. It is employed by the Chinese 
government as a tool for improving its image, but it is also perceived as an indicator of 
world status.70 In this regard, it has become a goal in its own right. Callahan proclaims 
that soft power in China is primarily employed as a tool in domestic policy rather than in 
foreign policy.71 This means it is mostly concerned with safeguarding the regime’s 
legitimacy at home, while also seeking to build favour among foreign audiences.  
Opinions of various Chinese academics on the subject range from positive about 
China’s capacity to exert soft power on the global stage to negative, claiming that China’s 
soft power is underdeveloped.72 I will discuss the opinions of two Chinese academics. 
Mingjiang Li describes soft power as “not existing in the nature of certain resources of 
power, but rather it has to be nurtured through a soft use of power. It has to be 
intentionally cultivated through prudent use of all sources of power available in certain 
social relationships.”73 He argues that certain power resources can generate both hard 
and soft power. An example is a country’s military strength, which can generate hard 
power when used coercively, but soft power when it is used in peacekeeping operations. 
Therefore Li opts for a ‘soft use of power’ approach.74 Yan Xuetong proposes that a 
country’s political power should be the core of soft power strategies.75 By this, he means 
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the political support the people of a country give to their government. The fact that the 
people stand behind their government, increases a country’s capacity, and functions as 
an attractive force. The fact that soft power is strategically employed by the Chinese 
government and heavily debated amongst academics refutes the view of American 
scholars and politicians that China does not understand soft power.  
 
 
3.2. The Power of the Chinese Space Programme 
 
Now that we have obtained a solid understanding of the notion of power, I will 
look at how power is generated by the Chinese space programme. Since it is a very 
broad subject to look into how power is generated, I will merely address the most 
important and primary aspects of China’s space programme that are able to generate 
power. This is necessary to and will be a crucial component in answering my sub 
question “how does China’s behaviour on the world stage differ from its projected image 
through public diplomacy?”. 
The statement that every country’s space capability is able to generate power is a 
given fact, since there are both military purposes as well as power projection involved, 
which are an inseparable component to a country’s space programme. The most tangible 
and apparent form of power is military power, which is primarily employed in four ways: 
homeland defence, reassurance, deterrence, and power projection.76 I will briefly 
elaborate on the use of China’s space programme in these four functions. 
Homeland defence secures China’s independence and national security. The 
Chinese space programme serves this purpose due to its military capacity. In an age 
where informationalised warfare is slowly replacing conventional warfare, China 
possesses an important tool of communication and intelligence satellites.77 With the 
United States relying for 75% to 80% of their intelligence and communication on space 
assets, power is derived from the capacity to incapacitate or manipulate those assets.78 
Space capabilities also possess a strong deterrent value. Deterrence concerns itself with 
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dissuading an opponent to do something instead of using threat to persuade one.79 
China’s ASAT-systems (anti-satellite systems) that are capable of destroying or 
incapacitating in-orbit satellites or China’s launch sites that could launch missiles 
instead of communication satellites could deter other countries to launch an attack on 
China, or to do something China dislikes. Power projection is another important part of 
China’s space programme. Even when power is not used in a coercive way, it is still able 
to project power that also has real life implications. On the first China National Space 
Day, president Xi Jinping called on the country’s scientists to help realise China’s dream 
of becoming a “global space giant”. This power projection is further strengthened 
through military diplomacy, in which China initiates joint exercises, port calls or 
cooperative missions. Coercive power can be used either offensively or defensively. 
China uses its space programme defensively to demonstrate power. The last use of 
military power is reassurance. China’s space programme can be used as reassurance to 
neighbouring countries, by letting countries along the One Belt, One Road use the 
Beidou-navigation systems. Reassurance is also a necessary goal, as China’s 
neighbouring countries are still wary of China’s behaviour and interests in the region.80 
 Besides military power or the projection of military power, the Chinese space 
programme also generates economic power, that serves China’s economic interests. By 
launching payloads for other countries, investing in new commercial launching pads on 
sea, and inviting other countries to work together on China’s future space station, China 
is able to establish the rules for economic cooperation and do things on China’s terms.  
 One goal imbedded in China’s power projection is to be able to create national 
prestige. China is very sensitive to international perceptions and hopes the projection of 
both military power and power generated through civilian projects, such as a moon 
landing, will add to China’s national prestige and will help China become a space super 
power.  
All of the above-mentioned resources add to China’s power and power-projection 
capabilities, and directly influence its regional position as well as its position on the 
global stage. As we have seen, demonstrating power is omnipresent in China’s space 
programme. In the next chapter, I will discuss the strategic implications of China’s space 
programme.     
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4. Space Competition or Useful Coalition? 
 
In the previous chapter we have seen the different ways in which the Chinese 
space programme is capable of generating power. While some aspects of the Chinese 
space programme have a softer use, other aspects feel more threatening or coercive. My 
conclusion is that most of these aspects entail power projection. While we do 
differentiate between hard and soft power, the line we draw is theoretical. In this 
chapter I will look into the strategic aspect of China’s space programme and explain how 
China’s behaviour on the world stage does not always match the image it is trying to 
project.  I will do this by looking at some recent events and developments that underline 
this divergence between image and behaviour. Consequently, I will look at the use of 
China’s space programme from a strategic perspective. In the second part of this chapter, 
I will speculate on whether these developments could lead to a global power shift and 
what a new space age would look like. 
 
 
4.1. Strategic perspective 
 
4.1.1. What’s going up? 
 
In recent years, China’s space programme has been attracting more and more 
attention and has become more visible, not only to academics and government officials, 
but also to a broader international audience, with media reporting on different space 
activities, achievements and ambitions, while at the same time still clouding itself in 
secrecy. While some of these activities or actions reinforce its projected image, others 
contradict it. In the following section I will discuss some of these actions or events that 
contradict China’s projected image. 
While this is an apparent part of its space programme, the Chinese government 
does use its space technology for military and security purposes, further explained in a 
white paper on China’s military strategy published in 2015.81 The white paper on 
China’s military strategy states: “Outer space has become a commanding height in 
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international strategic competition. Countries concerned are developing their space forces 
and instruments, and the first signs of weaponisation of outer space have appeared. 
(…)China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and 
challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and 
social development, and maintain outer space security.”82 To secure its national security 
interests, China is investing in air-space defence force structures, air and missile defence, 
information countermeasures, and airborne operations. I must emphasise that this is not 
a unique fact or an endemic aspect of China’s space programme, as other countries, e.g. 
the United States, also use their space programme for military and national security 
purposes.  
In August 2016, China announced that it had launched the world’s first quantum 
satellite, which has the ability to use hack-proof communication systems.83 This means 
that messages can be transmitted securely without risks of falling in the wrong hands. 
Xinhua News Agency reported about this achievement that “these were enormous 
prospects for the use of such technology in fields including defence, military and 
finance.”84 A recent trend in military development is the focus on informationisation of 
war. Some scholars think that all future wars will be fought in the ether using 
information and intelligence instead of actual military forces and are seen as a strategic 
requirement for any war. The realisation of this quantum satellite is a big step for China 
in the field of IT, and will certainly help China in any possible future informationisation 
war. 
Another mission that raised eyebrows amongst the international public and came 
under scrutiny because of its nature, was the Aolong Mission. The Aolong spacecraft that 
was launched in August 2016 has a robotic arm that can reach another satellite and 
guide it to burn up in the Earth’s atmosphere. This means that while it is officially to 
remove space debris from orbit, it could also be used as a weapon, bringing down a 
rival’s satellite.85 Together with the Yaogang missions, consisting of a series of remote 
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sensing satellites, this mission leaves room for debate on whether these satellites are for 
scientific or military purposes.  
Other elements that are part of the weaponisation of outer space include 
exploiting the near-space “death zone” for military intelligence purposes. This is a region 
of the Earth’s atmosphere that features prominently in countries’ use of ASAT-satellites 
(Anti-Satellite systems) and spy drones. These ASAT-weapons are able to destroy or 
incapacitate satellites. China proved that their systems are capable of shooting in-orbit 
satellites by performing tests in 2008 and 2010, which was reported to have been a 
message to the United States to showcase China’s military power.86  
 
4.1.2 Strategic implications 
 
What are the implications of this power generated by the Chinese space 
programme for China’s strategic interests, and maybe even more importantly, how does 
this influence China’s position on the world stage? Almost inherently linked to the 
Chinese Communist Party is the fact that we can never be sure what their interests or 
motives are behind a certain policy proposal, founding of a new institution or 
introducing a new strategy. There are however some observations that stick out and say 
something about China’s strategic interests. 
 One of the most important interests and one that receives high priority, is the use 
of China’s space programme for regional security. China is sometimes still seen by its 
neighbouring countries as a threat, and it has difficulty creating a solid sphere of 
influence in the region. Any regional allies are mostly in Central-Asia, such as “all-
weather friend” Pakistan. China’s relationship with e.g. Japan and South-Korea however 
remains difficult and is mostly of an economic nature. One of its top priorities is to build 
its national security system as a tool for power projection. 
 Another aspect that ties into this is China’s relationship with the United States. 
Although they are each other’s main trading partner, there still exists a sense of 
competition and suspicion that dominates this relationship.87 When former American 
President Obama presented his “Pivot to Asia-strategy” as a renewed focus on East-Asia, 
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China regarded this as a way for the US to gain more influence in the region. China’s 
main concern here is the Taiwan conflict. It fears that the US will interfere in case of an 
escalation into an armed conflict, and will back Taiwan with military support.88 When 
president Trump made a phone call after he was elected to Taiwanese president Cai 
Yingwen, Beijing was watching attentively. The situation in the South China Sea does not 
improve things. The US has exercised different patrols in the disputed waters of the 
South China Sea party claimed by China, while China emphasises multilateral dispute 
settlements only with the countries involved that actually make a claim in that South 
China Sea. 
 Despite the abovementioned, I do not think that China is looking for a space war 
or coercive use of its military applications. Throughout the public diplomacy messages I 
have analysed, multilateral forums and international institutions, China is seeking out 
peaceful cooperation in space, and tries to get this in writing as much as possible 
through international treaties. The fact that the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty in 2001 does not create an easier environment for signing treaties on 
space security.89 
 China’s space programme is also a useful resource in strengthening cooperation 
through new partnerships and alliances. As we have seen in chapter 2, China 
increasingly focuses its cooperation on developing countries by launching their satellites, 
or by founding the APSCO with other developing countries. Consolidating influence 
through these new partnerships could translate to actual geopolitical power on the 
ground. This is a very tactical element of China’s space programme, one that other space 
agencies, such as NASA and ESA, have not explored sufficiently. This underlines China’s 
strategy of filling the gaps in the world that Western countries created by not paying 
sufficient attention the opportunities the countries provide. China is turning these 
opportunities into commercial successes as well, by building launch pads in sea and 
increasing the launches of commercial payloads. 
 The fact that space capability is seen as an indication of global-leadership status 
adds an element of competition to the countries pursuing this goal. China has repeatedly 
emphasised that one of its goals in space is to be recognised as a global space power, as 
we have seen in the analysis in chapter 2. Its relationship with India and Japan is partly 
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characterised by this race, as all three countries strive towards the goal of becoming a 
global space power. India plans to land a rover on the moon in 2018, something China 
has achieved in 2013.90 The fact that Japanese astronauts are allowed to cooperate 400 
kilometres in the air on the International Space Station, while the US congress forbade 
NASA to cooperate with or finance Chinese astronauts, is still sensitive to China. 
In the last few years, China has invested heavily in creating a softer and more 
favourable image of itself through public diplomacy. Though we have seen that this 
image is not always accurate and does not reflect China’s goals in space, it is also not an 
entirely false representation. I first want to emphasise that it is not odd that China tries 
to project this favourable image, because it is still struggling with negative perceptions 
of itself.91 But to make this image more believable it should substantiate words with 
deeds. By becoming a player that is consistent in its actions as well as its principles, 
(mainly) Western countries might be more open to cooperation. To project a certain 
image might create goodwill amongst the international public, but as long as the image 
is not backed up by actions, it will not be effective. Therefore China should start 
practising what it preaches. To quote Harper Lee in To Kill a Mockingbird: “People 
generally see what they look for, and hear what they listen for.” If this attitude changes, 
China might be perceived in a different light. 
Furthermore, I think this power projection works as a deterrent and China would 
not actively use its military capability to coerce countries into doing something. It is still 
not comfortable in its regional influence sphere, even though it has invested heavily in 
creating more influence, like the building of a space corridor along the One Belt, One 
Road. China is using the civilian projects of its space programme to build prestige, and 
the military projects to project power.92 
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4.2. Does China’s rise equal a global power shift? 
 
 
What does this mean for China’s position as a competitor in space power 
dynamics? Regardless of its projected image, China’s space programme is growing at a 
high pace. As the third country to put a man in space, one of three countries to possess 
launch carrier rocket facilities, and the first country planning to send a rover to the far 
side of the moon, China is catching up with the other space powers. When it comes to 
space technology, China is already on a similar level with the European Space Agency, 
closely followed by Japan and India.93 
As we have seen in chapter two, China is very aware of its position in this space 
race. It does not want people to forget that in the future they might be the only country 
in possession of a permanently manned space station, as the International Space Station 
is planned to be decommissioned in 2024. Like other times when existing international 
institutions did not sufficiently cater to China’s interests, it set up their own institutions, 
and will do the same with their space station, inviting other countries to cooperate by 
China’s rules. In a very tactical timing, China plans the launch of their Mars rover in 2020, 
the same year that NASA and ESA in a joint-cooperation will launch their own Mars 
rover. With China leaning towards cooperation with Roscosmos and ESA now and in the 
future rather than with NASA, the United States might lose its leading position in space 
exploration.94 With the commencement of the Trump administration in 2017, there have 
been some indications that the US is not ready to give up its leading position. On 29 June 
2017, American President Trump signed an executive order to re-establish the National 
Space Council, after an in-active period of 24 years. The National Space Council is an 
advisory committee focused on developing a national space strategy and improving 
coordination between agencies with a stake in space operations.95 During the 
announcement, Trump said: “We're going to lead again. It's been a long time, over 25 
years, and we're opening up and we're going to lead again like we never led before. (…) 
The next great American frontier is space.”96 In addition to this, on 11 December 2017 
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President Trump signed a new space policy directive that directs NASA to return to the 
moon, and eventually to Mars.97 The president announced that this order would “restore 
American leadership in space”.98 The word choice of “restore” suggests that the US feel 
they have lost part of their influence in space, something that could be caused by China’s 
increasing presence in space and filling the gaps the US has created , or because they 
simply want to regain international prestige and power by further advancing its space 
programme. NASA has scheduled some ambitions missions, and plans to send humans to 
Mars by 2033. 
At the same time, Roscosmos is building a new launch site on its own soil, making 
its current launch pad Baikonur Kosmodrome in Kazakhstan, that Russia has been 
renting from the Kazakh government for the last fifty years, obsolete. Besides from being 
permanently represented on the International Space Station by its cosmonauts, 
Roscosmos has the second-highest number of launches per year after China, and also 
closely cooperates with China on different projects and knowledge exchange.99 
Now that China is cooperating more closely on different space projects with ESA 
and ROSCOSMOS instead of with NASA, the ballast could lie more towards the Eastern 
side of the Atlantic instead of the Western hemisphere, and could mean that it is time for 
the United States to get past their suspicions about cooperating with China in space, lest 
they get left behind. Like an ESA-official said during the ESA Open Day 2017 in 
Noordwijk, “International cooperation is the only way through which we can explore our 
universe to the max. (…) If we turn it into a competition, there will only be losers.”  
Any global power shift is signified by a shift from one country to another in the 
prominence of shaping global order and establishing global norms.100 The ability to help 
establish global norms and be part of the decision-making process in international 
affairs, is a defining aspect of being a super power. Whether China will achieve this in 
the near future, is a question Walter and Foot have researched by looking at the level of 
behavioural consistency with global norms of China and the United States.101 Their 
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conclusion was that China has a growing potential to shape the global order of the 21st 
century. Because it wants to be recognised as a great responsible power, it shows 
enhanced support for multilateral security frameworks, and shows a high level of 
behavioural consistency. The big exception is when the existing global norms run 
counter to China’s domestic interests, e.g. when it had to make adjustments in order to 
join the World Trade Organisation in 2001.102 Although domestic factors sometimes 
prompt China to depart from the global norms, it also feels that a commitment to these 
global norms will improve its legitimacy and discourage other from attempting to 
destabilise its political system, or to constrain its choices.103 On the other hand, while the 
United States have always been an important source of norm elaboration, it does show a 
tendency to depart periodically from global norms that it helped to establish.104 This 
inconsistency with global norms derives mostly from its unilateral exercise of force and, 
like in China’s case, unwillingness to abide by rules that run counter to its domestic 
interests or when they constrain policy choices.  
With respect to China’s space programme, I agree with Walter and Foot that 
China will remain within the global normative framework. China indicates to do so by 
complying with global norms of peaceful cooperation in space and showing its support 
for multilateral frameworks of the UN and other organisations on space security. China 
is becoming an increasingly important player in space, one that not only follows, but is 
also starting to set a precedent by choosing a different path upwards. The statuses of 
rule-follower and rule-maker are not mutually exclusive. While I think the top priorities 
of its space programme are national security and using it as a symbol for global power, 
they are not quite ready to replace the United States as a major space power yet. 
Technologically, they still have miles to go before they get to that level. The same thing is 
true for their capability of exerting influence on an international level. Although it will 
be a while before they are able to surpass the United States, they do challenge the status 
quo of space power dynamics by setting up their own space cooperation organisations, 
helping developing countries launch their satellites, developing ground-breaking 
technology and providing an alternative to the International Space Station in the future. 
I think it is important that China continues to make an effort to project a positive image 
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of its space programme towards the international public. Nobody likes a bully, and even 
less so a bully with too much power. 
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Conclusion 
 
China has made enormous strides since the past decennium in advancing its 
space programme to serve its national strategic interests. In order to project a more 
favourable image of itself, China has featured its space programme as a crucial part of its 
public diplomacy strategies. This thesis tried to investigate the use of the Chinese space 
programme in public diplomacy strategies by analysing the projected message through 
public diplomacy sources, focusing specifically on power projection. In order to analyse 
this message, I chose to study the White Paper on Space Activities published in 2016, 
Xinhua News Agency media coverage on the Chinese space programme and Chinese 
collaboration in space. Although I acknowledge that these sources form a foundation 
that is empirically thin, I have argued that they are nonetheless able of providing us with 
the general message that is projected through these sources. 
The message projected through public diplomacy can be divided into five distinct 
categories: 
 China as a technologically highly advanced country. In the white paper and 
the Xinhua media coverage, China emphasises its technological achievements 
in space, showcasing expertise and authority. 
 China as a peaceful player on the world stage. By affirming its willingness to 
abide by the international laws on peaceful space exploration, by its 
confirmation to peacefully cooperate in space, and by its claim that their space 
programme does not only benefit China, but the whole of mankind, China 
projects an image of a peace-loving country, which is reinforced by the fact 
that China calls its plans in space a “space dream”.  
 China as a developing country. As part of a larger discourse, in the field of 
space exploration China also projects an image of a developing country. China 
reinforces this by emphasising equal rights to explore space, and specifically 
standing up for those rights of developing countries. China also aims to help 
other developing countries to realise their space dream by launching or 
exporting satellites.  
 By understating the military aspect of China’s space programme, China 
positions itself as a partner instead of an enemy. 
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 By comparing itself with the other space powers in media articles, and 
reiterating how China could be the only country with a space station in the 
future, they show a competitive element to space exploration. 
An interesting sub question that arises when having obtained a coherent picture 
of the projected image, is whether this image differs from China’s behaviour on the 
world stage. I have answered this question by looking into China’s military as well as the 
strategic use of its space programme. We have seen that the favourable image China 
projects as a peace-loving nation that is open to cooperation and pursuing goals that will 
benefit mankind is contradicted by the hard fact that it uses its space programme for 
military and security purposes. It is trying to increase its influence and building alliances 
by launching satellites for developing countries and setting up space cooperation 
organisations with developing countries. By investing in these alliances and projecting 
both power and prestige through its space programme it arguably tries to gain 
geopolitical power in the region. Because of the shift from conventional to 
informationalised warfare, China is preparing itself by investing in intelligence and 
surveillance satellites and has achieved to turn some of its space assets into hack-proof 
system. Consequently, I have briefly discussed how China’s rise as a space power will 
change space power dynamics, and whether it will cause a global power shift. I have 
argued that although China has become one of the most important players in space 
competition, it is not yet on a similar level with the United States and the European 
Union when it comes to space technology and exerting influence. It wants to be 
acknowledged as a global space power and treated as such.  
With respect to the question whether this means that China will help shape a new 
global order or establish global norms, I have argued that that China will remain within 
the global normative framework and that it concerns itself primarily with wanting to be 
acknowledged as a responsible great power and a space power. Rule-follower and rule-
maker are not mutually exclusive statuses, and China could both abide by existing 
international norms, while also creating new norms by setting up its own organisations 
and establishing rules of cooperation for its future space station. 
A space competition is taking shape, and the outcome could determine our global 
order in the 21st century. The board is set, and the pieces are moving. It will be 
interesting to see how the new space policy directive, signed by American President 
Trump on 11 December 2017, will unfold, and how this will affect international space 
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cooperation. The fact that the President has announced that “American greatness and 
leadership in space will lead us to once again launch American astronauts on American 
rockets from American soil” does not indicate any plans for closer cooperation between 
the US and China.105 With China’s own plans to achieve similar goals the United States 
have set, the space competition is not yet decided. 
The aim of this thesis was to provide a clear picture of the image China tries to 
project of its space programme through public diplomacy strategies, and how this image 
differs from China’s behaviour on the world stage. Although China emphasises its role in 
space as a peaceful player, pursuing cooperation and knowledge that will benefit 
mankind, I have argued that it uses its space programme primarily to serve its economic 
and political interests, and tries to translate its space programme to geopolitical power 
on the ground. By focusing on how power is generated my thesis fits in a larger scholarly 
debate, to which I hope I have contributed. 
I would like to conclude with the idiom “space is the final frontier”. Countries who 
take the lead in exploring this frontier could also take the lead when it comes to solving 
international issues, setting international agendas and making decisions that will affect 
the entire world. Whether China is up to this challenge, is a question for future scholars 
to research. We will have to wait and see what the future brings, but one thing is certain: 
if a new space race does take shape, China is ready to compete. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 https://www.space.com/39055-trump-space-policy-moon-return-reactions.html.  
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